Security/Sandbox
Overview
Security Sandboxing makes use of child processes as a security boundary. The process model, i.e. how Firefox is split into various processes and how these processes interact between each other is common to all platforms. For more information see the Electrolysis wiki page. The security aspects of a sandboxed child process are implemented on a per-platform basis. See the Platform Specifics section below for more information.
Technical Docs
Current Status
Sandbox | Trunk | Beta | Release | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Level | Level | Version | Level | Version | ||
Windows (content) | Level 3 | Level 1 | Fx50 | Level 1 | Fx50 | |
Windows (compositor) | Level 0 [1] | |||||
Windows (GMP) | enabled | enabled | enabled | |||
Windows 64bit (NPAPI Plugin) | enabled | enabled | enabled | |||
OSX (content) | Level 3 | Level 1 | Fx52 | Level 1 | Fx52 | |
OSX (GMP) | enabled | enabled | enabled | |||
Linux (content) | Level 3 | Level 2 | Fx54 | Level 2 | Fx54 | |
Linux (GMP) | enabled | enabled | enabled |
A 'level' value reflects unique sandbox security settings for each platform and process. Most processes only have two "active" levels, the current setting and a lower (previous released) setting. Level settings other than these two values carry no guarantee of altering security behavior, level settings are primarily a release rollout debugging feature.
DEPRECATION WARNING - The current level system will be replaced by a configuration system that allows for more fine grain control over sandbox settings. Current target for this change is Firefox 57.
[1] Level 1 available but disabled due to various regressions, see bug 1347710
Windows
Content
Sandbox security related setting are grouped together and associated with a security level. Lower level values indicate a less restrictive sandbox.
Sandbox Feature | Level 0 | Level 1 | Level 2 |
---|---|---|---|
Job Level | JOB_NONE | JOB_NONE | JOB_INTERACTIVE |
Access Token Level | USER_NON_ADMIN | USER_NON_ADMIN | USER_INTERACTIVE |
Alternate Desktop | no | no | no |
Alternate Windows Station | no | no | no |
Initial Integrity Level | INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM | INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW | INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW |
Delayed Integrity Level | INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM | INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW | INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW |
Mitigations | None |
MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
Delayed Mitigations | None |
MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
Sandbox Feature | Level 3 | Level 10 | Level 20 |
---|---|---|---|
Job Level | JOB_RESTRICTED | JOB_RESTRICTED | JOB_LOCKDOWN |
Access Token Level | USER_LIMITED | USER_LIMITED | USER_LOCKDOWN |
Alternate Desktop | no | yes | yes |
Alternate Windows Station | no | yes | yes |
Initial Integrity Level | INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW | INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW | INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW |
Delayed Integrity Level | INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW | INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW | INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED |
Mitigations |
MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
Delayed Mitigations |
MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
Gecko Media Plugin
Sandbox Feature | Level |
---|---|
Job Level | JOB_LOCKDOWN |
Access Token Level | USER_LOCKDOWN, USER_RESTRICTED[1] |
Initial Integrity Level | INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW |
Delayed Integrity Level | INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED |
Alternate desktop | yes |
Mitigations |
MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
Delayed Mitigations |
MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
[1] depends on the media plugin
64-bit Plugin
Sandbox Feature | Level |
---|---|
Job Level | JOB_UNPROTECTED |
Access Token Level | USER_INTERACTIVE |
Initial Integrity Level | INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW |
Delayed Integrity Level | INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW |
Alternate desktop | no |
Mitigations |
MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
Delayed Mitigations |
OSX
Content Levels
Job Level | What's Blocked by the Sandbox? |
---|---|
Level 1 |
|
Level 2 |
|
Level 3 |
|
[1] Level 1 restrictions are a subset of level 2. Level 2 restrictions are a subset of level 3.
See How security.sandbox.content.level Affects File Access and Filter rules for more details.
Gecko Media Plugins
Linux
Content Levels
Job Level | What's Blocked by the Sandbox? |
---|---|
Level 1 |
|
Level 2 |
|
Level 3 |
|
Content Rules
Gecko Media Plugin
Preferences
Process Type | Preference Type | Preference |
---|---|---|
Content | numerical | security.sandbox.content.level |
NPAPI Plugin | boolean | dom.ipc.plugins.sandbox-level.default dom.ipc.plugins.sandbox-level.<plugintype> |
Compositor | numerical | security.sandbox.gpu.level |
Media | Embedded | N/A |
Note - Levels greater than the current default for a particular process type are not implemented.
File System Restrictions
Sandboxing enforces file system write and read restrictions for XUL based add-on content (frame and process) scripts. To avoid issues as sandboxing features roll out add-on authors should update their legacy add-on code today such that content scripts no longer attempt to read or write from restricted locations. Note these restrictions do not affect WebExtension content script or XUL add-on script running in the browser process.
File system access rules for content processes, reverse precedence:
Location | Access Type | Restriction |
---|---|---|
file system | read/write | deny by default |
install location | write | deny |
install location | read | allow |
system library locations | write | deny |
system library locations | read | allow |
profile/* | read/write | deny by default |
profile/extensions | write | deny |
profile/extensions | read | allow |
Debugging Features
Activity Logging
The following prefs control sandbox logging. Output is sent to the Browser Console when available, and to a developer console attached to the running browser process.
security.sandbox.logging.enabled (boolean)
security.sandbox.windows.log.stackTraceDepth (integer, Windows specific)
The following environment variables also triggers sandbox logging output:
MOZ_SANDBOX_LOGGING=1
OSX Specific
Sandbox violation logging is on by default when the sandbox is enabled. Use the Console.app application to view the logs.
Environment variables
ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE | DESCRIPTION | PLATFORM |
---|---|---|
MOZ_DISABLE_CONTENT_SANDBOX | Disables content process sandboxing for debugging purposes. | All |
MOZ_DISABLE_GMP_SANDBOX | Disable media plugin sandbox for debugging purposes | All |
MOZ_DISABLE_NPAPI_SANDBOX | Disable 64-bit NPAPI process sandbox | Windows |
MOZ_DISABLE_GPU_SANDBOX | Disable GPU process sandbox | Windows |
Setting a custom environment in Windows
1) Close Firefox
2) Browser to the location of your Firefox install using Explorer
3) Shift + Right-click in the folder window where firefox.exe is located, select "Open command window here"
4) Add the environment variable(s) you wish to set to your command window -
set MOZ_DISABLE_NPAPI_SANDBOX=1
(return)
5) enter firefox.exe and press enter to launch Firefox with your custom environment
Local Build Options
To disable building the sandbox completely build with this in your mozconfig:
ac_add_options --disable-sandbox
To disable just the content sandbox parts:
ac_add_options --disable-content-sandbox
Bug Lists
- Windows Content Process
- sbwc1
- low integrity sandbox support
- Roll out level 1 sandbox policy to release. (completed, fx50)
- sbwc2
- file:/// isolation
- User token removal, to limit User directory file access
- use JOB_RESTRICTED to apply further global restrictions
- printing tests
- roll out level 3 to release
- Need to scope out future milestones including:
- using an alternate desktop
- using an alternate winstation and desktop
- general file system (and registry) read access restrictions (USER_RESTRICTED / UESR_LOCKDOWN)
- JOB_LOCKDOWN
- reducing exposure to system APIs
- running at untrusted integrity level
- use of lowbox token / AppContainers
- sbwc1
- OSX Content Process
- sbmc1
- Roll out level 1 OSX security sandbox access ruleset. (completed, fx52)
- Prevent file system write access
- sbmc2
- Home directory read access restrictions
- file:/// isolation
- roll out level2 OSX sandbox to release
- sbmc3
- TBD: Triage existing sandbox rules and define set to remove in milestone 3
- File access: system /tmp and /var/folders/ and any other individual directories
- Limit User directory file access
- sbmc1
- Linux Content Process
- sblc1
- enable (heavily perforated) seccomp-bpf filter by default in Nightly
- sblc2
- land basic file system broker
- remove/restrict file system write access
- roll out entry level file broker to release
- sblc3
- remove/restrict file system read access
- file:/// isolation?
- remote pulseaudio work (BLOCKED on media work, TBD)
- sblc4
- remove/restrict socket access/modification and solve X11 problem
- sblc5
- make use of chroot and user namespaces
- sblc1
- Windows 64-bit NPAPI
- sbwn1
- (completed, fx52)
Triage Lists
- Triage list: http://is.gd/Mfb8L9
- Lists any bug with sb?
- Lists sandboxing component bugs that are not tracked by a milestone
- Ignores sb+, sb-, and sb? bugs with needinfos
- meta bugs
- sb? Triage List: http://is.gd/B3KscF
- does not include needinfo bugs
- sb? needinfos: http://is.gd/dnSyBs
- webrtc specific sandboxing bugs: https://is.gd/c5bAe6
- sb tracking + 'webrtc'
Communication
Weekly Team Meeting | Thursday at 8:00am PT
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IRC |
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Newsgroup/Mailing List |
People
Engineering Management |
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Project Management |
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QA |
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Development Team |
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Other Teams |
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Repo Module Ownership
Links
- Electrolysis Wiki Page (lot of additional resource links)
- Chromium Sandbox
- Apple's Sandbox guide
- "Introducing Chrome's next-generation Linux sandbox" (seccomp-bpf related)
- Native Client on Wikipedia (Links to papers on Native Client's design and use of SFI, as well as papers on SFI itself.)
- Features of Protected Mode in Internet Explorer
Research
B2G Archive
B2G has always been “sandboxed” to some extent; every app/tab gets its own content process, which uses the Android security model: a separate uid per process, no group memberships, and kernel patches that require group membership for things like network access. But privilege escalation via kernel vulnerabilities is relatively common, so we also use the seccomp-bpf system call filter to reduce the attack surface that a compromised content process can directly access.